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Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is immune to all the de-
tection attacks, thus when it is combined with the decoy state method, the final key is unconditional
secure, even if practical weak coherent source are used by Alice and Bob. However, until now, the
analysis of decoy state MDI-QKD with weak coherent source is incomplete. In this paper, we de-
rive, with only vacuum+weak decoy state, some tight formulas to estimate the lower bound of yield
and the upper bound of error rate for the fraction of signals in which both Alice and Bob send
single photon pulse to the untrusted third party Charlie. The numerical simulations show that our
method with only vacuum+weak decoy state can asymptotically approach to the theoretical limit of
the infinite number of decoy states. Furthermore, the statistical fluctuation due to the finite length
of date is also considered based on the standard statistical analysis.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd
Introduction- Quantum key distribution (QKD), such
as the BB84 protocol [1], admits two remote parties,
known as Alice and Bob, to share unconditional secu-
rity key, which is guaranteed by the quantum mechanics
and has been proved in theory [2–4]. However, the se-
tups used in the practical system are imperfect, which
will leave some loopholes for Eve to spy the secret key.
In fact, some potential quantum hacking strategies have
been discovered by exploiting the imperfection of practi-
cal setups, such as the passive faraday mirror attack [5],
blinding attack [6], time-shift attack [7], and so on [8–10].
Therefore, the legitimate parties must carefully reexam-
ine their practical system to close all the loopholes, when
they use this system in practical situations.
In order to close the gap between the theory and prac-
tice, some approaches have been proposed. The first one
is trying to characterize the practical system fully and
considered all the side-channel existed in the practical
system. Although some potential loopholes have been
discovered and then closed by using this approach, it can
not find all the loopholes existed in the practical sys-
tem, since, theoretically speaking, the number of loop-
hole is infinite. The second approach is trying to establish
full device-independent (DI-) QKD system [11, 12]. The
DI-QKD can guarantee the unconditional security of the
practical system without knowing the detailed informa-
tion of the practical setups of Alice and Bob. However,
this approach is impractical within current technology,
since it requires that the legitimate parties have single
photon detectors with near unit detection efficiency.
In stead of full DI-QKD, recently, Lo et al. proposed
a novel scheme called measurement-device-independent
(MDI-) QKD [13], in which both Alice and Bob send
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pulse to an untrusted third party, called Charlie. Charlie
performs the Bell state measurement (BSM) and tells her
results to Alice and Bob, then Alice and Bob can use this
information to distill secret key. Since the detection party
can be fully controlled by the eavesdropper (Eve), this
scheme is immune to all the detector attacks. Thus the
legitimate parties just need to ensure that the source is
secret, then the total QKD system is secret. In fact, this
condition can be satisfied in practical situations, since the
source is relatively simple and can be fully characterized.
Although the MDI-QKD has been demonstrated in ex-
periments [16, 17], and some modified schemes for fiber-
based system have bee proposed [14, 15], it is not com-
pletely device-independent. It requires the source of Alice
and Bob is perfect, for example the pulse sent by Alice
and Bob should be single photon state. However, within
current technology, the weak coherent state is often used
due to the lack of a feasible single photon source, which
will send multi-photon pulses with nonzero probability
and suffer from the photon-number-splitting (PNS) at-
tack [18, 19]. Luckily, the same problem is also faced
for the regular BB84 protocol with the weak coherent
state, and the decoy state method [20–23] has been pro-
posed to efficiently estimate the contribution of single
photon pulse. Thus the decoy state method can also be
introduced to the MDI-QKD to close the loophole of the
multi-photon pulses.
However, the analysis for the decoy state MDI-QKD is
different from the regular decoy state QKD for the regu-
lar BB84 protocol [20–23]. Recently, the security of the
decoy state MDI-QKD has been considered by many re-
searchers [13, 14, 24–26]. However, there still exists some
disadvantages for theirs results. In Ref.[13], Lo et al. an-
alyze the security of decoy state MDI-QKD assuming in-
finitely long data and infinitely many decoy states, which
is impractical due to the limited resource in practical sit-
uations. In Ref.[14, 24, 25], the authors considered the
effect of the finite-size data and a finite number of decoy
2states, but their analysis has two disadvantages: first,
the authors estimate the contribution of single-photon
pulses by solving the nonlinear minimization problem,
but not giving general formulas liking the regular decoy
state QKD; second, four states (vacuum+two-weak decoy
state) are needed to close to the asymptotic limit of in-
finitely decoy states. Therefore, a more stringent security
bound and the general theory of decoy state MDI-QKD
is imperative.
In this paper, we discuss the decoy state MDI-QKD
with vacuum+weak decoy state, in which both Alice and
Bob use three kinds of state with different intensity (one
signal state, one decoy state and one vacuum state).
Then we derive general formulas to estimate the yield
Y11 and error rate e11 for the fraction of signals in which
both Alice and Bob send single photon pulse to Charlie.
The numerical simulations show that our formulas are
very tight, and our vacuum+weak decoy state method
asymptotically approaches to the theoretical limit of the
infinite decoy state method.
Protocol- In this paper, we consider the following decoy
state MDI-QKD protocol [13, 14, 24]:
(1)Alice randomly generates three kind of pulses with
different intensity, the signal state with a intensity µ2,
the decoy state with a intensity µ1 and the vacuum state
with a intensity µ0 ≡ 0. Without loss of generality, we
assume that µ2 > µ1 > 0. For each pulse, Alice randomly
chooses her basis from {x, z} and bit from {0, 1}. Then
she modulates her information on each pulse and sends it
to Charlie, which can be fully controlled by Eve. At the
same time, Bob performs the same processing as Alice,
and the intensities of Bob’s pulse are noted as ν2, ν1 and
ν0 ≡ 0 (ν2 > ν1 > 0) for signal state, decoy state and
vacuum state, respectively.
(2)Charlie performs BSM, and tells her measurement
results to Alice and Bob through a public channel. Then
Alice and Bob compare their basis for each pulse. If they
use the same basis and Charlie has a successional BSM
event, they keep this bit as raw key.
(3)For each case that Alice’s intensity is µi, Bob’s in-
tensity is νj and the basis is ω = x, z, Alice and Bob
estimate the parameters of channel, including the total
gain Qωµiνj , the total error rate E
ω
µiνj , and the yield (er-
ror rate) of both Alice and Bob send single photon pulse,
noted as Y ω11 (e
ω
11). With these parameters, Alice and
Bob can estimate the final key rate, which is given by
[13, 24]
R ≥ µ2ν2e−µ2−ν2Y z11[1−H(ex11)]−Qzµ2ν2fH(Ezµ2ν2), (1)
where f is the error correction inefficiency, H(x) =
−x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the binary Shannon
entropy function. Note that Qzµ2ν2 and E
z
µ2ν2 are directly
measured in experiment, thus Alice and Bob need to es-
timate the lower bound of Y z11 and upper bound of e
x
11
to maximize her key rate. The main contribution of this
paper is that we give two tight formulas to estimate Y z11
and ex11 with only vacuum+decoy state. Here we assume
that only the signal states of Alice and Bob, µ2 and ν2,
are used to distill the secret key. The decoy states are
used to estimate the parameters of channel.
Note that, when the phase of pulse sent by Alice
and Bob is totally randomized, the quantum channel
can be considered as a photon-number channel model
[21, 24], and the state of Alice and Bob is ρµ =∑∞
n=0
µn
n! e
−µ|n〉〈n|, where µ = {µi, νj |i, j = 0, 1, 2}.
Thus, the total gain and error rate of Alice’s intensity
µi and Bob’s intensity νj can be written as [24]
Qωµiνj =
∞∑
n,m=0
µni ν
m
j
n!m!
e−µi−νjY ωnm
EωµiνjQ
ω
µiνj =
∞∑
n,m=0
µni ν
m
j
n!m!
e−µi−νjY ωnme
ω
nm,
(2)
where Y ωnm (e
ω
nm) is the yield (error rate) when Alice
sends n−photon pulse, Bob sends m−photon pulse, and
the basis ω is used by them. Obviously, according to
Eq.2, if infinite decoy states are used, Alice and Bob can
exactly obtain Y z11 and e
x
11. However, the resource is finite
in practical situations, thus only finite decoy state can be
used by the legitimate parties. In the following, we give
two tight formulas to bound these parameters, which are
the main contributions of this paper. The numerical sim-
ulations show that our formulas with only vacuum+weak
decoy state can asymptotically approach the theoretical
limit of infinite decoy states.
The lower bound of Y ω11- Note that the expression of
Eq.2 is independent on ω, thus when there is on ambigu-
ity, we neglect the superscript ω in the following of this
paper. Then the total gain Qµiνj can be written as
eµi+νjQµiνj =
∞∑
n,m=0
µni ν
m
j
n!m!
Ynm
=
∞∑
m=0
νmj
m!
Y0m + µi(Y10 + νjY11 +
∞∑
m=2
νmj
m!
Y1m)
+
∞∑
n=2
µni
n!
(Yn0 + νjYn1 +
∞∑
m=2
νmj
m!
Ynm)
=eνjQ0νj + e
µiQµi0 −Q00 + µiνjY11 + h(µi, νj),
(3)
where
h(µi, νj) =
∞∑
m=2
µiν
m
j
m!
Y1m+
∞∑
n=2
µni νj
n!
Yn1+
∞∑
n,m=2
µni ν
m
j
n!m!
Ynm.
(4)
3Thus we will have
eµ2+ν2Qµ2ν2 − eµ1+ν1Qµ1ν1
=g1 + (µ2ν2 − µ1ν1)Y11 +
∞∑
m=2
µ2ν
m
2 − µ1νm1
m!
Y1m
+
∞∑
n=2
µn2ν2 − µn1ν1
n!
Yn1 +
∞∑
n,m=2
µn2ν
m
2 − µn1νm1
n!m!
Ynm
≥g1 + (µ2ν2 − µ1ν1)Y11 + a
∞∑
m=2
µ2ν
m
1 + µ1ν
m
2
m!
Y1m
+ b
∞∑
n=2
µn2ν1 + µ
n
1ν2
n!
Yn1 + c
∞∑
n,m=2
µn2ν
m
1 + µ
n
1ν
m
2
n!m!
Ynm
≥g1 + (µ2ν2 − µ1ν1)Y11 + α[h(µ2, ν1) + h(µ1, ν2)]
=g1 + g2 + g3 − (µ1ν1 − µ2ν2 + αµ2ν1 + αµ1ν2)Y11,
(5)
where we use the fact that for any n,m ≥ 2, the following
inequalities always hold, which are given by
µ2ν
m
2 − µ1νm1
µ2νm1 + µ1ν
m
2
≥ µ2ν
2
2 − µ1ν21
µ2ν21 + µ1ν
2
2
≡ a ≥ 0,
µn2ν2 − µn1ν1
µn2ν1 + µ
n
1ν2
≥ µ
2
2ν2 − µ21ν1
µ22ν1 + µ
2
1ν2
≡ b ≥ 0,
µn2ν
m
2 − µn1νm1
µn2ν
m
1 + µ
n
1ν
m
2
≥ µ
2
2ν
2
2 − µ21ν21
µ22ν
2
1 + µ
2
1ν
2
2
≡ c ≥ 0.
(6)
And α = min{a, b, c}. Here g1, g2 and g3 are defined as
g1 = e
ν2Q0ν2 + e
µ2Qµ20 − eν1Q0ν1 − eµ1Qµ10,
g2 = α(e
µ2+ν1Qµ2ν1 − eν1Q0ν1 − eµ2Qµ20 +Q00),
g3 = α(e
µ1+ν2Qµ1ν2 − eν2Q0ν2 − eµ1Qµ10 +Q00).
(7)
It is easy to check that for any α, µ1ν1−µ2ν2+αµ2ν1+
αµ1ν2 > 0 always holds. And note that the expression of
equations from Eq.3 to Eq.7 are the same for both z-basis
and x-basis. Thus the lower bound of Y ω11 is given by
Y ω11 ≥ Y ω11 ≡
gω1 + g
ω
2 + g
ω
3 − eµ2+ν2Qωµ2ν2 + eµ1+ν1Qωµ1ν1
µ1ν1 − µ2ν2 + αµ2ν1 + αµ1ν2 .
(8)
where ω = z, x.
The upper bound of eω11- According to Eq.2 and Eq.3,
we have
eµ1+ν1Qµ1ν1Eµ1ν1 = g4 + µ1ν1Y11e11 + h
′(µ1, ν1), (9)
where
g4 =e
ν1Q0ν1E0ν1 + e
µ1Qµ10Eµ10 −Q00E00,
h′(µ1, ν1) =
∞∑
m=2
µ1ν
m
1
m!
Y1me1m +
∞∑
n=2
µn1ν1
n!
Yn1en1
+
∞∑
n,m=2
µn1ν
m
1
n!m!
Ynmenm.
(10)
Obviously, h′(µ1, ν1) ≥ 0, thus the upper bound of eω11
can be written as
eω11 ≤ eω11 ≡
eµ1+ν1Qωµ1ν1E
ω
µ1ν1 − gω4
µ1ν1Y ω11
, (11)
where ω = z, x, and Y ω11 and g4 are given by Eq.8 and
Eq.10 respectively.
Numerical Simulation- Note that when Eve is absent,
the total gains and error rates of Alice’s intensity µi and
Bob’s intensity νj are given by [14, 24]
Qxµiνj = 2y
2[1 + 2y2 − 4yI0(s) + I0(2s)],
QxµiνjE
x
µiνj = e0Q
x
µiνj − 2(e0 − ed)y2[I0(2s)− 1],
Qzµiνj = QC +QE,
QzµiνjE
z
µiνj = edQC + (1− ed)QE ,
(12)
where
QC = 2(1− Pd)2e−µ
′/2[1− (1− Pd)e−ηaµi/2]
× [1− (1− Pd)e−ηbνj/2]
QE = 2Pd(1 − Pd)2e−µ
′/2[I0(2s)− (1− Pd)e−µ
′/2].
(13)
And I0(s) is the modified Bessel function of the first
kind, ed is the misalignment-error probability, e0 = 1/2
is the error rate of background, Pd is the dark count
of single photon detector, ηa (ηb) is the transmission of
Alice (Bob), and µ′ = ηaµi + ηbνj , s =
√
ηaµiηbνj/2,
y = (1− Pd)eµ′/4.
Submitting Eq.12 into Eq.8 and Eq.11, we can estimate
the lower bound of yield Y z11 and upper bound of error
rate ex11 when both Alice and Bob send single photon
state. The estimated parameters of Y11 and e11 are shown
in Fig.1(b) and (c) respectively, which clearly shows that
our vacuum+weak decoy state method is very close to
the asymptotic limit of the infinite decoy state method.
Then, with these parameters, we can estimate the key
rate, which is shown in Fig.1(a). It clearly shows that
the key rate with our method is also very close to the
asymptotic limit of the infinite decoy state method. Note
that the key rate is maximized by optimizing the intensity
of signal state and decoy state. The optimal intensity for
our method and infinite decoy state method are shown in
Fig.2. It shows clearly that the optimal signal intensity is
the order of O(1), which is the same as the regular decoy
state.
Furthermore, our method can perform better than the
method proposed by Ma et al. [24], which estimated
the contribution of single photon state, Y z11 and e
x
11, by
solving the nonlinear minimization problem. The results
are listed in the Table I. It clearly shows that the key
rate estimated by our method is larger than that of Ma’s
method.
Statistical Fluctuation- In practical situations, the
length of raw key is also finite, which will induce sta-
tistical fluctuation for the parameters estimation. In this
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FIG. 1: (Color online) The key rate of decoy state MDI-QKD.
The solid line is obtained for the infinite decoy state method,
in which the exactly Y z11 and e
x
11 are known. The dot-dashed
line is obtained for our vacuum+weak decoy state method, in
which the lower bond of Y z11 and the upper bound of e
x
11 are
given by Eq.8 and Eq.11, respectively. The key rate is max-
imized by optimizing the intensity of pulse, which is shown
in Fig.2. The same parameters as Ref.[24] are used in our
simulations, which are ed = 1.5%, Pd = 3× 10
−6, f = 1.16.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The optimal intensity for signal state
and decoy state to maximize the key rate. The optimal in-
tensity is obtained by researching the intensity of signal state
(µ2 and ν2)and decoy state (µ1 and ν1) from 0.01 to 0.6 with
a step 0.01. In the simulations, we assume that ηa = ηb,
µ2 = ν2 and µ1 = ν1. And other parameters are the same as
Fig.1.
section, we considered the affect of finite length of raw
key based on the standard statistical analysis [23, 24], in
which the lower bound and upper bound of experimental
results, Qωµiνj and E
ω
µiνj , are given by
Qωµiνj ≤ Qωµiνj ≤ Qωµiνj ,
QωµiνjE
ω
µiνj ≤ QωµiνjEωµiνj ≤ QωµiνjEωµiνj ,
(14)
TABLE I: The comparing between our method and Ma’s
method. We assume that ηa = ηb = 0.1. Here we directly
take the results of Ma’s method from Ref.[24].
Parameters our method Ma’s method with
vacuum+weak
(µ2 = ν2 = 0.36) (µ2 = ν2 = 0.5)
Y z11 4.1967 × 10
−3 4.6043 × 10−3
ex11 2.7241% 10.2126%
R 1.3548 × 10−4 6.8877 × 10−5
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The key rate of decoy state MDI-QKD
with statistical fluctuation. The solid line is obtained for the
infinite decoy state method with infinite length of data. The
dashed lines are obtained for our vacuum+weak decoy state
with different length of data. In the simulations, we assume
that five standard deviation (nα = 5) is used. N is the length
of data.
where Qωµiνj = Q
ω
µiνj (1 − βq), Qωµiνj = Qωµiνj (1 +
βq), Q
ω
µiνjE
ω
µiνj = Q
ω
µiνjE
ω
µiνj (1 − βeq), QωµiνjEωµiνj =
QωµiνjE
ω
µiνj (1 + βeq), and βq = nα/
√
NωµiνjQ
ω
µiνj , βeq =
nα/
√
NωµiνjQ
ω
µiνjE
ω
µiνj . Here N
ω
µiνj is the length of pulse
of Alice’s intensity µi, Bob’s intensity νj and ω basis. nα
is the standard deviations, which is related to the fail-
ure probability of the security analysis. For example, if
nα = 5, the failure probability is 5.73× 10−7 [24]. Thus
the lower bound of Y ω11 and upper bound of e
ω
11, which
are given by Eq.8 and Eq.11, should be rewritten as
Y ω11 ≥Y ω11 ≡
gω1 + g
ω
2 + g
ω
3 − eµ2+ν2Qωµ2ν2 + eµ1+ν1Qωµ1ν1
µ1ν1 − µ2ν2 + αµ2ν1 + αµ1ν2 ,
eω11 ≤eω11 ≡
eµ1+ν1Qωµ1ν1E
ω
µ1ν1 − gω4
µ1ν1Y ω11
,
(15)
where gωk (k = 1, 2, 3) and g
ω
4 are given by Eq.7 and Eq.10.
Submitting the equations above into Eq.1, we can esti-
mate the secret key rate with finite length of data, which
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FIG. 4: The estimated yield and error rate of single photon
pulse for z-basis and x-basis. The solid lines are obtained by
using Wang’s Eq.(16) for yield and the corrected Eq.(17) for
error rate [26]. The dashed lines are obtained by our method.
The estimated values are optimized by searching the optimal
intensity of Alice and Bob, and other parameters are same as
this paper.
is shown in Fig.3. It clearly shows that the finite length
of raw key will obviously compromise the secret key rate.
In the simulations, we assume the standard deviation is
nα = 5 and the length of data is same for each pair of
intensities of Alice and Bob.
Discussion- In the first version of this paper, we claim
that “In Ref.[26], Wang presents general formulas for the
decoy state MDI-QKD with three intensity states (vac-
uum+weak decoy state), but their formulas are very re-
laxant, and no secret key can be generated when these
foumulas are applied.” We acknowledge that this conclu-
sion is obtained by directly applying Eq.(16) and Eq.(17)
of Ref.[26] to estimate the yield and error rate of single
photon pulse, and we only compare the final secret key
rate in the simulations, but do not individually analyze
and compare the estimated values of yield (Eq.(16)) and
error rate (Eq.(17)). Recently, Wang updates a new ver-
sion of his paper, in which a corrected formula is given to
estimate the error rate of single photon pulse. Taking this
correction, we recalculate the key rate of Wang’s method,
and find that the key rate obtained by his method is a
bit higher than that of our method, thus we withdraw
the claim and show these new simulation results in this
revised version, which are given by Fig.4 and Fig.5. The
two figures clearly show that both Wang’s method and
our method can give a better estimation of yield and er-
ror rate of single photon pulse, and Wang’s Eq.(16) [26],
the formula for the single-photon yield, is actually a bit
better than that of our Eq.(8).
Conclusions- The MDI-QKD can exclude all the de-
tection loopholes in practical situations, and when it is
combined with the decoy state method, the final key gen-
erated by the MDI-QKD is unconditional security, even
the practical weak coherent sources are used by Alice
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FIG. 5: The key rate of our method and Wang’s method. The
solid lines are obtained by Wang’s method with the corrected
formula of Eq.(17). The dashed lines are obtained by our
method.
and Bob. However, the security of decoy state MDI-
QKD is incomplete. In this paper, we discuss the de-
coy state MDI-QKD with vacuum+weak decoy state, in
which both Alice and Bob use three kinds of state with
different intensity (one signal state, one decoy state and
one vacuum state). Then we derive general formulas to
estimate the yield and error rate for the fraction of signals
in which both Alice and Bob send single photon pulse to
Charlie. The numerical simulations show that our formu-
las are very tight, and our method with vacuum+weak
decoy state method asymptotically approaches to the
theoretical limit of the general decoy state method (with
an infinite number of decoy states).
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